NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNDER KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY - BREAKING DOWN BACKWARD INDUCTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DOW, J; WERLANG, SRD
署名单位：
Getulio Vargas Foundation
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1071
发表日期：
1994
页码：
305-324
关键词：
摘要：
We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal-form games in the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the formalization of Schmeidler and Gilboa, we show that Nash equilibrium exists for any degree of uncertainty aversion, that maximin behaviour can occur even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense, and that backward induction breaks down in the twice repeated prisoners' dilemma. We relate these results to the literature on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, and the literature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this model of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.