AN EQUILIBRIUM RESULT FOR GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION AND INFINITELY MANY PLAYERS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BALDER, EJ; RUSTICHINI, A
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1021
发表日期：
1994
页码：
385-393
关键词：
摘要：
Balder (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players.