A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Waehrer, K
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1084
发表日期：
1995
页码：
531-555
关键词：
摘要：
This paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller. In the event of a default on the auction contract, the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit. When renegotiation is possible, increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller's payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder. Under these conditions the seller's payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.