SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OF REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
NEME, A; QUINTAS, L
署名单位：
Autonomous University of Barcelona; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1058
发表日期：
1995
页码：
599-608
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the payoff vectors which are obtained by considering issues of perfection in the Rubinstein (A. Rubinstein, J. Econ. Theory 38 (1986), 83-96) (R) model. The paper concludes that there is little change in the set of payoff vectors but that the proposed equilibrium strategies are different from those suggested in R. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.