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作者：CHO, IK
摘要：We examine the implications of bounded rationality in repeated games by modeling the repeated game strategies as perceptrons (F. Rosenblatt, ''Principles of Neurodynamics,'' Spartan Books, and M. Minsky and S. A. Papert, ''Perceptions: An Introduction to Computational Geometry,'' MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988). In the prisoner's dilemma game, if the cooperation outcome is Pareto efficient, then we can establish the folk theorem by perceptrons with single associative units (Minsky and Papert),...
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作者：CHANG, R
摘要：Two governments bargain over the benefits of a monetary union in a cash-in-advance world. A novel feature of the model is that, because households trade every period, market behavior affects and is affected by the government negotiations. As a result, in addition to objective costs of delay, market expectations about the bargaining outcome emerge as crucial determinants of a monetary union. There is a continuum of bargaining outcomes indexed by market expectations. Some outcomes imply that the...
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作者：ATKESON, A; LUCAS, RE
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross-sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper ...
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作者：BHATTACHARYA, U; RENY, RJ; SPIEGEL, M
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A general equilibrium framework is employed to illustrate how the advent of trading in new securities, about which an ''insider'' has private information, might cause a collapse of prevailing security markets. Roughly, securities that allow the insider to hedge his portfolio risk interfere with one other, and in some cases, so much so that these securities cannot simultaneously trade in any equilibrium. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：JOUINI, E; KALLAL, H
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We derive the implications from the absence of arbitrage in dynamic securities markets with bid-ask spreads. The absence of arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of at least an equivalent probability measure that transforms some process between the bid and the ask price processes of traded securities into a martingale. These martingale measures can be interpreted as possible linear pricing rules and can be used to determine the investment opportunities available in such an economy. The mini...
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作者：ELUL, R
摘要：We show that in almost every incomplete markets economy with more than one consumption good, and with sufficiently many uninsured states of nature, at any general equilibrium of this economy it is possible to arbitrarily perturb the equilibrium utilities merely by introducing the appropriate asset-making, for example, all agents worse off. This result demonstrates that the examples given by Hart (On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete, J. Econ. Theory 11 (1975...
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作者：DUTTA, PK
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：In many dynamic economic applications, the appropriate game theoretic structure is that of a stochastic game. A folk theorem for such games is presented. The result subsumes a number of results obtained earlier and applies to a wide range of games studied in the economics literature. The result further establishes an underlying unity between stochastic and purely repeated games from the point of view of asymptotic analysis, even though stochastic games offer a much richer set of deviation poss...
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作者：KHALIL, F; LAWARREE, J
作者单位：University of Liege
摘要：We observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal-agent relationship. We show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by the identity of the residual claimant of the principal-agent relationship. The principal will find input monitoring more efficient if the principal is the residual claimant, and he will find output monitoring more efficient if the agent is the residual claimant. If residual claimancy is a choice, the principal wil...
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作者：MAGGI, G; RODRIGUEZCLARE, A
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives, shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling (''inflexible rules''). Our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent's utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter: the optimal contract is separating in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case. Journal of Economic...
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作者：BERTOCCHI, G; WANG, Y
作者单位：Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We study an overlapping generations model where the level of confidence in money evolves endogenously as a function of aggregate real money balances. The economy can display multiple stationary equilibria where the aggregate bubble on money is stochastic and the level of confidence is partial. Steady states can be ranked by the degree of confidence, with more inefficiency being associated with less confidence. It is only under certain restrictions that the Golden Rule constitutes a steady stat...
