ON COUNTERVAILING INCENTIVES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MAGGI, G; RODRIGUEZCLARE, A
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1040
发表日期：
1995
页码：
238-263
关键词：
摘要：
This paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives, shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling (''inflexible rules''). Our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent's utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter: the optimal contract is separating in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D82. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.