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作者：TSUI, KY
摘要：This paper generalizes the relative and absolute inequality measures pioneered by Atkinson, Kolm, and Sen to the multidimensional setting with K attributes of well being. Social evaluation functions satisfying a set of axioms which are natural generalizations of their counterparts in the unidimensional context are first introduced. Then it is shown that different scale invariance axioms inexorably lead to classes of relative and absolute inequality indices. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：SILEO, PW
摘要：A model is developed which represents an agent's imperfect access to his true preferences via a ''sensation of preference'' function. The resulting structure, which is mathematically related to stochastic preferences, implies commonly observed intransitivities of indifference while maintaining the property of strong monotonicity. Properties of the agent's perceived preference relation and the implications for trading behavior are explored. Consistent with experimental and survey data, and unli...
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作者：PESENDORFER, W
摘要：We develop a model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries can issue new financial securities against collateral in the form of standard securities. Intermediaries have to market their innovations and marketing is costly. We show that the equilibrium asset structure may exhibit redundancies as frequently observed on financial markets. We give conditions for efficiency of financial innovation and show that with small innovation costs the indeterminacy of equilibrium allocations has sma...
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作者：KNOBLAUCH, V
摘要：Every symmetric, constant-sum, two-person game with strategy set [0, 1] and payoff functions that are continuous off the diagonal is a location game. Location game versions can therefore be used to analyze games not usually thought of in geometric terms. By way of illustration, a location game version is used to provide geometric insights into a Cournot duopoly game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：MA, BK; WEISS, JH
摘要：Under the assumption that preferences can be represented by linear-in-parameters utility functions, Caplin and Nalebuff (Econometrica 59 (1991), 1-23) have demonstrated that in a super-majority voting problem, the mean voter's choice is unbeatable according to a rule that depends on the distribution and dimensionality of voters' preferences. We show in some cases that the mean voter and the social choice, as well as this rule, are not invariant with respect to transformations of the parameters...
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作者：VIVES, X
摘要：The paper studies the rate at which dispersed private information about the value a of a risky financial asset is incorporated into prices in an information adjustment mechanism. The mechanism, in the presence of competitive market makers, aggregates the information of risk averse agents at a rate of n(-1/2), where n is the number of rounds of the adjustment process. Without market makers, convergence of prices to v is much slower. In any case the asymptotic precision of prices is negatively r...
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作者：DEMANGE, G; LAROQUE, G
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：In a static exchange economy where the traders' initial endowments are risky, the optimality of the financial structure is studied when markets are incomplete. Only financial structures with the same number of assets are compared. A market structure is optimal, when, in a particular economy, it yields an allocation of risks which cannot be Pareto-dominated through the implementation of any other market structure. In a linear Gaussian setup, the optimal market structures are shown to span an ei...
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作者：LUO, GY
摘要：Profit maximization is the usual prerequisite for achievement of a perfectly competitive equilibrium. However, for a long time it has been thought that this principle of profit maximization can be replaced by natural selection. In an evolutionary model of an industry, where firms' outputs are chosen randomly, where entry occurs with no motivation, and where exit occurs when a firm's wealth becomes negative, this paper shows that the industry converges in probability to a perfectly competitive ...
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作者：BENCIVENGA, VR; SMITH, BD; STARR, RM
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Hicks (''A Theory of Economic History,'' Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969) argues that an important aspect of industrial development is the adoption of technologies requiring highly illiquid capital investments. The adoption of such technologies becomes economically viable in the presence of low-cost financial markets that provide liquidity to investors. This observation provides a mechanism by which the costs of transacting in financial markets affect the equilibrium choice of technology, produc...
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作者：DUTTA, PK
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper investigates the following claims: in a dynamic game, (i) Pareto-optimal outcomes are sustainable only by patient players and (ii) the set of equilibrium outcomes expands in the discount factor. The intuition for these results, although immediate for purely repeated games, is shown to be incomplete for dynamic games. Consequently, there is no direct link between patience and the sustainability of Pareto-optimal outcomes. In fact, there are dynamic games arbitrarily ''close'' to a re...
