A FOLK THEOREM FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DUTTA, PK
署名单位：
Columbia University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1030
发表日期：
1995
页码：
1-32
关键词：
摘要：
In many dynamic economic applications, the appropriate game theoretic structure is that of a stochastic game. A folk theorem for such games is presented. The result subsumes a number of results obtained earlier and applies to a wide range of games studied in the economics literature. The result further establishes an underlying unity between stochastic and purely repeated games from the point of view of asymptotic analysis, even though stochastic games offer a much richer set of deviation possibilities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73, D90. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.