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作者：EDLIN, AS; EPELBAUM, M
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We ask when firms with increasing returns can cover their costs independently by charging two-part tariffs (TPTs), a condition we call independent viability. To answer, we develop notions of substitutability and complementarity that account for the total value of goods and use them to find the maximum extractable surplus. We then show that independent viability is a sufficient condition for existence of a general equilibrium in which regulated natural monopolies use TPTs. Independent viability...
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作者：DUFFIE, D; RAHI, R
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London
摘要：The article describes, in the context of theory and practice, this special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on financial market innovation and security design. The main focus is on security design in incomplete financial markets, possibly with asymmetrically informed traders. We first survey the general equilibrium literature, which emphasizes the spanning role of securities. We then provide a unified framework encompassing the literature that employs a CARA-Gaussian setting to study th...
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作者：SERRANO, R
摘要：I present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex TU game. The mechanism resembles an asset market, in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade. In addition, the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function. Therefore, the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games. The mechanism is inspired by the reduced game...
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作者：HARRINGTON, JE
摘要：This paper explores price-setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential. The informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in the size of the price differential. In markets with highly substitutable products, price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information. In mark...
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作者：DEMANGE, G; LAROQUE, G
摘要：The privileged information that the owners have on their firms may discourage rational financial investors and consequently may prevent the entrepreneurs from floating their company on the market. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to that of Grossman and Stiglitz [8]: an entrepeneur who contemplates issuing a new security faces a trade-off between speculative gains, which arise from his privileged information, and an insurance motive, associated with the insura...
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作者：OHASHI, K
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：This paper studies the determination of the number of futures contracts created by an exchange. We show that though the exchange can create the futures contracts costlessly; if the investors have differential information, there may be an upper bound on the number of contracts that the exchange is willing to create. In a stylized economy, we investigate what type of contracts and how many of these the exchange is willing to create. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D82...
