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作者：Lockwood, B
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but where there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by other agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two-way distortion: the effort of any agent is oversupplied (relative to the first-best) when his marginal cost of effort is low, and undersupplied taken his marginal cost of effort is high....
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作者：Ramos, HM; Ollero, J; Sordo, MA
作者单位：Universidad de Cadiz
摘要：In this paper, a sufficient condition for non-negative random variables to be ordered in the Generalized Lorenz sense is presented. This condition does not involve inverse distribution functions. Applications of this result to several income distribution models are given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D36, D69. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We show that the fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information is a subset of the ex- post core of the economy. (This inclusion may be proper; and it does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders.) Consequently. every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium correspondence of thr associated family, of full information economies, Moreover, when each, trader knows his or her own utility function and his of her own endowment, every fine core...
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作者：Aliprantis, CD; Tourky, R; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Melbourne; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：The modern convex-analytic rendition of the classical welfare theorems characterizes optimal allocations in terms of supporting properties of preferences by nonzero prices. While supporting convex sets in economies with finite dimensional commodity spaces is usually a straightforward application of the separation theorem, it is not that automatic in economies with infinite dimensional commodity spaces. In the last 30 years several characterizations of the supporting properties of convex sets b...
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作者：Sarin, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study a model in which a decision maker has limited memory. For a large class of decision rules that may be used to select among strategies the decision maker converges to play the maxmin strategy. The result arises not because of any inherent caution on the part of the decision maker, but because the decision maker's memory eventually contains only bad payoffs From the strategies no longer considered the best. Hence, a new rationale is provided for maxmin behavior. Classification Numbers C...
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作者：Cai, HB
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper analyzes a complete-information, infinite-horizon, multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. Under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies, we characterize the set of equilibria for the game. We show that when players are sufficiently patient, significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the...
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作者：Chang, R; Velasco, A
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; New York University; Universidad de Chile; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study financial fragility, exchange rate crises, and monetary policy in a model of an open economy with Diamond-Dybvig banks. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks on the currency become possible. We compare currency boards, fixed rates, and flexible rates, with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot...
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作者：Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade. Two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games, subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices. Furthermore, the payoffs t...
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作者：Samet, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Beliefs about quantities are expressed by estimations. Beliefs are quantified by ascribing to them probability numbers. It is, shown that beliefs about quantities and quantified beliefs give rise to the same model, that of a type space. We study the axiom that an agent's estimation coincides with the estimation of that estimation, showing it to be weaker than the introspection axiom, according to which an agent is certain of his own probabilistic beliefs. It implies, however, that the agent is...
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作者：Blume, A; Gneezy, U
作者单位：University of Iowa; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Classification Numbers: C72, C92. 2000 Academic Press.
