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作者：Bloch, F; Ferrer, H
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：This paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one price in three strategic market games with multiple trading posts. In bilateral oligopolies, where traders have corner endowments in one commodity, all agents participate in all the markets. The law of one price holds in bilateral oligopolies and in the buy-or-sell market game, where equilibrium strategies are locally unique, When traders can simultaneously buy and sell on every market, the law of one price fails an...
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作者：Bona, JL; Li, JX
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：The primary concern of this paper is understanding how prices and interest rates respond to open-market operations. In a model economy developed by Grossman and Weiss, but with more general utility functions, we establish global existence of equilibrium paths and observe that prices and interest rates rise initially, but thereafter oscillate around a new steady state. Also investigated are optimal monetary policies wherein injections take place in more than one time period and corresponding to...
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作者：Sandholm, WH
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study potential games with continuous player jets, a class of games characterized by an externality symmetry condition. Examples of these games include random matching games with common payoffs and congestion games. We offer a simple description of equilibria which are locally stable under a broad class of evolutionary dynamics, and prove that behavior converges to Nash equilibrium from all initial conditions. We consider a subclass of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient p...
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作者：Karp, L; Lee, IH
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Southampton
摘要：If agents learn by doing and are myopic, less advanced firms might adopt new technologies while more advanced firms would stick with the old technology. This kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are sufficiently patient. A finite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently. (C) 2001 Acad...
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作者：Cho, IK
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We examine the stability of rational expectations equilibria in the class of models in which the decision of the individual agent is discontinuous with respect to the state variables. Instead of rational expectations, each agent learns the unknown parameters through a recursive Stochastic algorithm. If the agents update the estimated value function rapidly enough, then each agent learns the true value function associated with the optimal action with prohability 1 and almost always takes the op...
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作者：Cole, HL; Kocherlakota, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player's actions are unobservable to the other players and each player's actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Forges, F; Minelli, E
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：We identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms. Both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result. Indeed, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty (i) in our class of economies if coalitions can only use deterministic mechanisms and (ii) outside this class, even if r...
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作者：Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies. in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency properly: in the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players: i.e.. there is no regret Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levins [1995. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 19, 1065-1090]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000. Econometrica 68, 1127-1150]) are...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint defines an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if ...
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作者：Hong, L; Page, SE
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：A substantial amount of economic activity involves problem solving, yet economies has few, if any, formal models to address how agents of limited abilities Find good solutions to difficult problems. In this paper. we construct a model ol heterogeneous agents of bounded abilities and analyze their individual and collective performance. By heterogeneity, we mean differences in how individuals repre sent problems internally. their perspectives, and in the algorithms they use to generate solutions...
