-
作者：Cazzavillan, G
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：In this paper we study the occurrence of local indeterminacy, endogenous fluctuations, and bifurcations in a simple non-monetary 2-period overlapping generations economy (in which people do not consume when young) with capital-labor substitution, elastic labor supply, and productive externalities. We show that, in contrast with the local dynamics generated by many one-sector models of capital accumulation studied in the current literature, local indeterminacy and, therefore, stationary stochas...
-
作者：Cozzi, G
作者单位：Cornell University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：The main issue raised in this note is the nonequivalence between the infinite-horizon model where agents are infinitely lived and the successive generations model with altruistic finitely lived agents: in the presence of a nonnegative bequest requirement, endowment heterogencity imposes a revision of the acritical adoption of the infinitely lived agent representation in modern macro-economics. By analysing nonstationary monetary equilibria in a reinterpretation of Townsend's tumpike model. thi...
-
作者：Aaberge, R
作者单位：Statistics Norway
摘要：This paper is concerned with distributions of income and the ordering of related Lorenz curves. By introducing appropriate preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves, two alternative axiomatic characterizations of Lorenz curve orderings are proposed. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is recognized to be rationalizable under both axiom sets; as a result, a complete axiomatic characterization of the Gini coefficient is obtained. Furthermore, axiomatic characterizations of the extended Gini fa...
-
作者：Laussel, D; Le Breton, M
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：This paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by B. D. Bernheim and M.D. Whinston (1986, Quart. J. Econ. 101, 1-31). By common agency we mean the following: an agent decides upon an action which affects its well-being as well as the well-being of n other individuals (the principals), each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen. Under complete information Bernheim and Whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of Nash equilibria they...
-
作者：Khan, MA; Sun, YN
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We present a version of the APT based on an asset index set of all arbitrary infinite cardinality. Under assumptions due to Ross ( 1976. J. Econ Theory 13, 341-360) and Chamberlain and Rothschild ( 1983. Econometrica 51. 1281 - 1303). we show that, in the absence of gains from asymptotic arbitrage, the square of the deviations of the individual rates of return from a factor-pricing formula sum to a Finite number and that this absence, while sufficient, is not necessary for the formula to hold....
-
作者：Eckwert, B; Zilcha, I
作者单位：Technische Universitat Chemnitz; Tel Aviv University
摘要：It is known that Blackwell's (1953, Ann. Math. Statist. 24, 265-272) theorem, according to which more information always has positive value, does not hold in many economic circumstances. In particular, in exchange economies with random endowments it may fail completely. We show that in certain economies with risk averse consumers and risk neutral producers the Blackwell theorem holds in competitive equilibrium, given that risk sharing markets are absent. However, in the presence of a risk shar...
-
作者：Barinci, JP; Chéron, A
摘要：This paper examines the cyclical properties of a finance constrained economy populated bg two classes of households with heterogeneous preferences and featuring social increasing returns-to-scale. The model exhibits indeterminacy for externalities mild enough so that the labor demand curve is downward sloping. Furthermore. simulation results show that endogenous fluctuations driven by expectations are quantitatively relevant. In opposition to standard Real Business Cycles and sunspot models wi...
-
作者：Friedman, JW; Mezzetti, C
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study repeated interactions among a fixed set of low rationality players who have status quo actions, randomly sample other actions, and change their status clue if the sampled action yields a higher payoff. This behavior generates a random process, the better-reply, dynamics. Long run behavior leads to Nash equilibrium in games with the weak-finite improvement property, including finite, super-modular games and generic, continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games. If players make mistakes ...
-
作者：Hellwig, M; Irmen, A
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：We develop a model of endogenous growth in an economy with competitive markets. Technical change arises from the intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking for profits. Opportunities for such profits stem from inframarginal rents. This provides a counterexample to the widespread view that endogenous technical change is possible only if innovating firms can expect to reap monopoly or oligopoly rents. The model has a unique equilibrium which involves steady growth at a positive rate. Equilibri...
-
作者：Dupor, B
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
摘要：The paper's theorems reverse two standard results of New Keynesian economics simply by appending endogenous investment to a benchmark imperfect competition-sticky price model. Our results are: (a) a passive interest rate rule, where the monetary authority responds to inflation by lowering the real interest rate, implies local equilibrium uniqueness, whereas an active rule does not generate a locally unique equilibrium; (b) a temporary, exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate causes a t...
