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作者：Larson, CE; Olson, LJ; Sharma, S
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper analyzes the stochastic inventory control problem when the demand distribution is not known, In contrast to previous Bayesian inventory models, this paper adopts a nonparametric Bayesian approach in which the firm's prior information is characterized by a Dirichlet process prior. This provides considerable freedom in the specification of prior information about demand, and it permits the accommodation of fixed order costs. As information oil the demand distribution accumulates, opti...
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作者：Johnson, P; Levine, DK; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game, Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior Of their opponents. If the value of the.-ift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique informa...
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作者：Zheng, CZ
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes auctions where budget-constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy. It predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders. When the borrowing rate is above a threshold, high-budget bidders win, and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low. When the borrowing rate is below the threshold, the winner is the most bud.-et-constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy. This result explains the high bids and brok...
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作者：Tourky, R; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We address a question posed by J.-F. Mertens and show that, indeed, R. J. Aumann's classical existence and equivalence theorems depend on there being many more agents than commodities. We show that for an arbitrary atomless measure space of agents there is a fixed non-separable infinite dimensional commodity space in which one can construct an economy that satisfies all the standard assumptions but which has no equilibrium, a core allocation that is not Walrasian, and a Pareto efficient alloca...
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作者：Gale, D; Rosenthal, RW
作者单位：New York University; Boston University
摘要：Results from D. Gale and R. W. Rosenthal [J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999). 1-40] are extended to characterize convergence properties of the model for (almost) every set of parameters. In particular. there is a sharp delineation between the parameter region in which the process of experimentation and imitation converges almost surely to the equilibrium and another region in which the process is only weakly convergent (unstable in the small but not too unstable). (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Zacharias, E; Williams, SR
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Cyprus
摘要：We examine the rate of convergence ro efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction for sequences of markets in which the number r,r or buyers can be arbitrarily larger than the number n of sellers. This rate is shown to be O(n/m(2)) when m, n are such that m greater than or equal to betan for a constant beta > 1. This is consistent with the O(1/m) rate that holds when 1/beta less than or equal to n/m less than or equal to beta, which is proven by A. Rustichini et al. (1994. Econometrica 62, 10...
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作者：Matsushima, H
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper presents a theoretical foundation to the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' ability to sustain implicit collusion. When firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor their opponents choices, it is impossible to achieve efficiency even if these firms have a Long-term strategic relationship. We show that when firms encounter each other in a number of distinct markets and the extent of this market contact is large, efficiency can be approximately susta...
