Core is manipulable via segmentation

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Sertel, M; Yildiz, M
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Turk Standardlari Enstitusu (TSE); Turkish Academy of Sciences
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.003
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 103-117
• 关键词: manipulability via segmentation; Decomposability; core; Walrasian equilibrium

摘要

Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individually rational sub-allocation the complementary coalition picks, when we paste all the agents back together at their new endowments and apply the allocation rule to this collage economy, each member of the former coalition will be strictly better off than under direct application of the allocation rule to the original economy. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.