Retrading in market games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghosal, S; Morelli, M
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00102-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 151-181
• 关键词: Market games; Retrading; myopic versus far-sighted behavior; retrade-proofness

摘要

When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations, consistent with Edgeworth's idea of recontracting. We show (a) there are Pareto optimal allocations, including competitive equilibrium allocations, that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilibrium at every round of retrading; (b) any converging sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading can be supported along some retrade-proof subgame perfect equilibrium path when traders anticipate future rounds of trading. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.