Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milchtaich, I
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00106-6
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 56-87
• 关键词: congestion; COOPERATION; nonatomic games; social optimality; cost sharing; Harsanyi TU value; potential

摘要

Congestion externalities may result in nonoptimal equilibria. For these to occur, it suffices that facilities differ in their fixed utilities or costs. As this paper shows, the only case in which equilibria are always socially optimal, regardless of the fixed components, in that in which the costs increase logarithmically with the size of the set of users. Therefore, achieving a socially optimal choice of facilities generally requires some form of external intervention or cooperation. For heterogeneous populations (in which the fixed utilities or costs vary across users as well as across facilities), this raises the question of utility or cost sharing. The sharing rule proposed in this paper is the Harsanyi transferable-utility value of the game-which is based on the users' marginal contributions to the bargaining power of coalitions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.