-
作者：Konishi, Hideo; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College; Koc University
摘要：It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any executable group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability....
-
作者：Miao, JJ
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equ...
-
作者：Grant, Simon; Polak, Ben
作者单位：Yale University; Rice University; Australian National University
摘要：Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P4. Stochastic monotonicity is sufficient to bridge the gap, where Anscombe and Aumman use independence...
-
作者：Kuksov, Dmitri
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and seller private and common knowledge on seller competition. It shows that lack of common knowledge results in the equilibrium price continuously decreasing to the perfectly competitive one as buyer search costs for price decrease from positive for all buyers to zero for all buyers, even if each market agent's uncertainty (in the private knowledge) is small. At the same time, if the uncertainty of each seller about buyer valuations is sma...
-
作者：Sagi, Jacob S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This note explores the implications of a simple and intuitive restriction on reference-dependent preferences assuming the status quo serves as the reference point. The condition imposed potentially rules out situations in which a decision maker has a choice between two prospects, selects one which subsequently becomes the new reference point, and then regrets her initial choice. It is shown that a surprising number of models in a riskless and risky setting violate this behavioral assumption, i...
-
作者：Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information one-shot game. An experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations. This provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations. These predictions match the ...
-
作者：Bisin, A; Horst, U; Özgür, O
作者单位：New York University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consid...
-
作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the cont...
-
作者：Doepke, M; Townsend, RM
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent environments with hidden states and hidden actions. Starting from a general mechanism with arbitrary communication, randomization, full history dependence, and without restrictions on preferences or technology, we show that the Optimal contract can be implemented as a recursive direct mechanism. A curse of dimensionality which arises from the interaction of hidden income and hidden actions can be ove...
-
作者：Peng, Shin-Kun; Thisse, Jacques-Francois; Wang, Ping
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; National Taiwan University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the interactions between economic integration and employment agglomeration in a neoclassical-growth, middle-product economy. There are two vertically integrated economies, with competitive final good firms operating plants in both regions and monopolistically-competitive intermediate good firms operating each in only one region. Immobile workers are employed with traded middle products to produce the nontraded final good; mobile workers are used with immobile capital to design and p...
