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作者：Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular,...
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作者：Gokan, Y
作者单位：Mie University
摘要：This paper introduces constant government expenditure in Woodford's finance constrained model (J. Econ. Theory, 1986) with capital-labor substitution as presented in Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (J. Econ. Theory, 1998) and investigates how government expenditure influences local dynamics near multiple steady states, depending upon the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bloch, F; Gomes, A
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options...
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作者：Nakajima, T
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：Using an efficiency-wage model, we examine the relationship between indeterminacy and unemployment insurance. It is shown that the less unemployment insurance is, the more likely equilibrium is to be indeterminate. Equilibrium can be indeterminate even without externalities or increasing returns, which makes a sharp contrast to the recent literature on indeterminacy. Our result is based on the fact that the no-shirking condition with marginal utility of wealth kept constant is downward sloping...
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作者：Sleet, C; Yeltekin, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Iowa
摘要：Empirical analyses of labor tax and public debt processes provide prima facie evidence for imperfect government insurance. This paper considers a model in which the government's inability to commit to future policies or to report truthfully its spending needs renders government debt markets endogenously incomplete. A method for solving for optimal fiscal policy under these constraints is developed. Such policy is found to be intermediate between that implied by the complete insurance (Ramsey) ...
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作者：Banks, JS; Duggan, J; Le Breton, M
作者单位：University of Rochester; California Institute of Technology; University of Rochester; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undomiated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on generic emptiness of the core; we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets; and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters' preferences are such that the core is nonempty...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bonn
摘要：The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini (Theory Decision 37 (1994) 107-124); Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173)). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the literature. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
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作者：Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：Duke University; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In...
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作者：Martinelli, Cesar
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them. Voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives. In agreement with Downs's rational ignorance hypothesis. individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases. However. if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information, there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent's particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the players. This class includes supermodular games, games with linear incentives and so forth. We show that, in PIM games, linear stability is equivalent to u-dominance, a generalization of risk-dominance, and that there is no ...
