Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dietrich, F
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 286-298
• 关键词: Judgment aggregation; formal logic; collective inconsistency; manipulation; Impossibility theorems; premise-based procedure; possibility theorems

摘要

The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to '' premises '', which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.