School choice: an experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Y; Sönmez, T
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 202-231
• 关键词: School choice; experiment; matching; Gale-Shapley; top trading cycles; boston mechanism

摘要

We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms have superior theoretical properties. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under Boston. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale-Shapley outperforms Top Trading Cycles and generates the highest efficiency. Our results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale-Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.