A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ledyard, John O.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Princeton University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 441-466
• 关键词: Public goods; mechanism design; interim efficiency; incentive compatibility; private values

摘要

We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.