The supercore for normal-form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Inarra, Elena; Larrea, Ma. Concepcion; Saracho, Ana I.
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 530-538
• 关键词: individual contingent threat situation; Nash equilibrium; subsolution; Von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set

摘要

This paper analyzes the supercore of a system derived from a normal-form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner's dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal-form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.