Bargaining and network structure:: An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Corominas-Bosch, Margarida; Frechette, Guillaume R.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Pompeu Fabra University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.009
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 28-65
• 关键词: Bargaining; experiment; graph theory; network; social learning

摘要

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link, and we find evidence of a form of social learning. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.