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作者：Ales, Laurence; Carapella, Francesca; Maziero, Pricila; Weber, Warren E.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes-dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in locatio...
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作者：Mongin, Philippe
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dreze, Jacques; Le Breton, Michel; Savvateev, Alexei; Weber, Shlorno
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; New Economic School
摘要：Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane. The population faces a problem of locating public facilities financed by its users, who face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We show that, under mild assumptions, an external intervention that covers a tiny portion of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its ...
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作者：Thomson, William; Yeh, Chun-Hsien
作者单位：University of Rochester; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Central University
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A rule associates with each such problem a feasible division. Our goal is to uncover the structure of the space of rules. For that purpose, we study operators on the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule another one. Duality, claims truncation, and attribution of minimal rights are the operators we consi...
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作者：Gajdos, T.; Tallon, J. -M.; Vergnaud, J. -C.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要：We axiomatize in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences called rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty as well as state dependent versions of these models. We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if and only if (society's) preferences are uncertainty neutral. The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral attitude toward uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that ...
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作者：Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. We characterize the most revealing equilibrium of this game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders...
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作者：Maniquet, Francois
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Choi, Syngjoo; Gale, Douglas; Kariv, Shachar
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; New York University; University of London; University College London
摘要：A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes. the theory lacks predictive power. To produce strong er predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equil...
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作者：Grinblatt, Mark; Liu, Jun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper applies the standard risk-neutral valuation framework to tax shields generated by dynamic debt policies. We derive a partial differential equation (PDE) for the value of the debt tax shield. For a class of dynamic debt policies that depend on the asset's free cash flows, value, and past performance, we obtain closed-form solutions for the PDE. We also derive the tax-adjusted cost of capital for free cash flows and analyze the conditions under which the weighted average cost of capit...
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作者：Minagawa, Junichi
作者单位：Chuo University
摘要：In Mukherji [Global stability condition on the plane: a general law of demand, J. Econ. Theory 134 (2007) 583-592], a set of sufficient conditions for global stability of price adjustment processes on the plane is identified. The aim of this note is to point out that one of the conditions can be dropped. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
