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作者：Hoon, Hian Teck; Phelps, Edmund S.
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the effects of future tax and budgetary shocks in a non-monetary and possibly non-Ricardian economy. An (unanticipated) temporary labor tax cut to be effective on a given future date-a delayed debt bomb-causes at once a drop in the (unit) value placed on the firms' business asset, the customer, with the result that share prices, the hourly wage, and employment drop in tandem. This paradox of reduced activity through announcement of future stimulus does not hinge on an upward jump of l...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); New York University
摘要：Correlations arise naturally in non-cooperative games, e.g., in the equivalence between undominated and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the non-cooperative assumption is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do these correlations come from? The epistemic view of games gives an answer. Under this view, the players' hierarchies of beliefs (beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, etc.) about the strategies played in the game are part of the descriptio...
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作者：Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe; Topuzu, Mihaela
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Coumot-Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79-94; On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207-223; A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437-470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of t...
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作者：Gardini, Laura; Sushko, Iryna; Naimzada, Ahmad K.
作者单位：University of Urbino; National Academy of Sciences Ukraine; Institute of Mathematics of NASU; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We consider a growth model proposed by Matsuyama [K. Matsuyama, Growing through cycles, Econometrica 67 (2) (1999) 335-347] in which two sources of economic growth are present: the mechanism of capital accumulation (Solow regime) and the process of technical change and innovations (Romer regime). We will shown that no stable cycle can exist, except for a fixed point and a cycle of period two. The Necessary and Sufficient conditions for regular or chaotic regimes are formulated. The bifurcation...
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作者：Azzimonti, Marina; de Francisco, Eva; Krusell, Per
作者单位：University of Iowa; University System of Maryland; Towson University; Princeton University
摘要：Who gains from stimulating output? We explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension: wealth. There are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population. First, poorer agents gain from a rise in wages, since-to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply-they work harder. Second, because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future, thus lowerin...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Rupert, Peter; Shell, Karl; Wright, Randall
作者单位：Cornell University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In a general-equilibrium economy with nonconvexities, there are sunspot equilibria with good welfare properties; sunspots can ameliorate the effects of the nonconvexities. For these economies, we show that agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility functions. We use this result to construct a new model of monetary exchange along the lines of Lagos and Wright. where trade occurs in both centralized and decentralized markets, but instead of quasi-linear preferences we assume general prefere...
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作者：Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southampton
摘要：Our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co-ordination in a game with strategic complementarities. We study two dynamic aspects: different agents make decisions at different points in time; and extra information about a payoff-relevant state of nature becomes available over time. We find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium. This is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs. We a...
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作者：Houy, Nicolas; Menager, Lucie
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要：Parikh and Krasucki [R. Parikh, P. Krasucki, Communication, consensus and knowledge, J. Econ. Theory 52 (1990) 178-189] show that, in a group of rational agents, communication of the value of a function f leads to a consensus on the value of f, provided some conditions on the communication protocol and the function f hold. In this article, we address the issue of the influence of the protocol on the outcome of the communication process, when agents value information positively. We show that, i...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Moulin, Herve; Tideman, Nicolaus
作者单位：Rice University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：For impartial division, each participant reports only her opinion about the fair relative shares of the other participants, and this report has no effect on her own share. If a specific division is compatible with all reports, it is implemented. We propose a family of natural methods meeting these requirements, for a division among four or more participants. No such method exists for a division among three participants. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the veto-power principle: the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: to design the default outcome and to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
