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作者：Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hitotsubashi University
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作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment. A set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets. At each point in time, an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt or raid immediately. By postponing the takeover attempt, an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions, but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals. First, a complete information ...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This note provides an alternative sufficient condition for the small income effect result that is first shown by Vives [Small income effects: a Marshallian theory of consumer surplus and downward sloping demand, Rev. Econ. Stud. 54(1) (1987) 87-103]. The condition is stated by ordinal terms only, whereas Vives assumes cardinal properties of utility representation. Second, as its application, we provide a sufficient condition for the preference being asymptotically quasi-linear, in a two good e...
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作者：Li, Ming; Madarasz, Kristof
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We study the quality of advice that an informed and biased expert gives to an uninformed decision maker. We compare two scenarios: mandatory disclosure of the bias and nondisclosure, where information about the bias can only be revealed through cheap-talk. We find that in many scenarios nondisclosure allows for higher welfare for both parties. Hiding the bias allows for more precise communication for the more biased type and, if different types are biased in different directions, may allow for...
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作者：Benchekroun, Hassan
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We build a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a common property productive asset oligopoly and analyze separately the impact of a change in the implicit growth rate of the asset and a change in the number of firms exploiting the asset. We show that the steady state level of asset can be a decreasing function of the asset's implicit growth rate. This phenomenon arises when the initial stock of asset is below a certain threshold. In the short-run we show that firms' exploitation rate can be a d...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Prokopovych, Pavlo; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have beta-delta preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative statics. Unless the minimax outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the equilibrium payoff set is not monotonic in beta or delta. Finally, we show how the equilibrium payoff set is contained in that of a ...
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作者：Kukushkin, Nikolai S.; Litan, Cristian M.; Marhuenda, Francisco
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS
摘要：We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Julien, Benoit; Kennes, John; King, Ian
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney; Aarhus University; University of Otago; University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium alloca...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; University of Warwick; University of London
摘要：We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary-clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price-taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions take into account that there is a small communication cost of deviating from a given outcome. We demonstrate that, given communicati...
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作者：Gervais, Martin; Livshits, Igor; Meh, Cesaire
作者单位：University of Southampton; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Bank of Canada
摘要：This paper studies the choice between general and specific human capital. A trade-off arises because general human capital, while less productive, can easily be reallocated across firms. Accordingly, the fraction of individuals with specific human capital depends on the amount of uncertainty in the economy. Our model implies that while economies with more specific human capital tend to be more productive, they also tend to be more vulnerable to turbulence. As such, our theory sheds some light ...
