Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gajdos, T.; Tallon, J. -M.; Vergnaud, J. -C.
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.10.001
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 68-99
• 关键词: aggregation; uncertainty

摘要

We axiomatize in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences called rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty as well as state dependent versions of these models. We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if and only if (society's) preferences are uncertainty neutral. The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral attitude toward uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that it is not possible to aggregate multiple prior agents, even when they all have the same set of priors. A number of ways to restore the possibility of aggregation are then discussed. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.