Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dreze, Jacques; Le Breton, Michel; Savvateev, Alexei; Weber, Shlorno
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 275-291
• 关键词: Secession-proofness; Optimal jurisdictions; Rawlsian allocation; Hexagonal partition; cross-subsidization

摘要

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane. The population faces a problem of locating public facilities financed by its users, who face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We show that, under mild assumptions, an external intervention that covers a tiny portion of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only mechanism that rules out secession threats. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.