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作者：Kovac, Eugen; Mylovanov, Tymofiy
作者单位：University of Bonn; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent R Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal delegation (e.g., [Bengt Holmstrom, On the theory of delegation, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland, 1984, pp. 115-141]): a principal-agent model with hidden...
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作者：Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Ruediger
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Universitat Siegen
摘要：In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem humans and other species compete for land and prey biomass. Each submodel exhibits a price-driven competitive allocation mechanism, and the endogenously determined habitat is either openly accessible or privately owned. In both scenarios specific corrective taxes or subsidies are needed to internalize ecosystem externalities. An open access habitat causes additional inefficiencies through diverging prices for b...
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作者：Goltsman, Maria; Hoerner, Johannes; Pavlov, Gregory; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Brescia; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We compare three common dispute resolution processes - negotiation, mediation, and arbitration - in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]. Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the pat-ties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to ...
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作者：Loisel, Olivier
摘要：We consider a broad class of linear dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models made of a finite number N of structural equations for N + 1 endogenous variables and to be closed by one policy feedback rule. We design, for any model of this class and any stationary VARMA solution of that model, a bubble-free policy feedback rule ensuring that this solution is not only the unique stationary solution of the closed model, but also its unique solution. We apply these results to locally linearis...
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作者：Martin, Alberto
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are m...
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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Vienna
摘要：We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence...
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作者：D'Agostino, Marcello; Dardanoni, Valentino
作者单位：University of Palermo; University of Ferrara
摘要：In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring social mobility when the social status of individuals is given by their rank. In order to sensibly represent the rank mobility of subgroups within a given society, we address the problem in terms of partial permutation matrices which include standard (global) matrices as a special case. We first provide a characterization of a partial ordering on partial matrices which, in the standard case of global matrices, coincides with the well-known ...
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作者：Rogers, Brian W.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestima...
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作者：Deb, Rahul
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences, where an individual's consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers. We assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers. It is known that the general consumption model with externalities imposes few restrictions on the observed data, where the consistency requirement is Nash rationalizability. We motivate potential games as an important sub class of games where the...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and g...
