Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van Zandt, Timothy
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.016
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 249-263
• 关键词: Supermodular games; incomplete information; Universal type spaces; Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium

摘要

We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each player and every type (rather than almost every type) chooses a best response to the strategy profile of the other players. There are no restrictions on type spaces and action sets may be any compact metric lattices. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.