Essential equilibria in normal-form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 421-431
• 关键词: Infinite normal-form game; equilibrium refinement; essential equilibrium; Payoff security

摘要

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, quasiconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result are also established. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.