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作者：Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weight...
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作者：Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：One of the oldest matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) [81 roommates problem: is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, stability ignores the key physical constraint that roommates require a room and is therefore too restrictive. This motivates a new matching problem: matching agents subject to an initial assignment. A p...
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作者：Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, V.
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：Recently Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have GilboaSchmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We suggest a model in which theories are ranked given various databases. Certain axioms on such rankings imply a numerical representation that is the sum of the log-likelihood of the theory and a fixed number for each theory, which may be interpreted as a measure of its complexity. This additive combination of log-likelihood and a measure of complexity generalizes both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Minimum Description Length criterion, which are well known in statistics and in machi...
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作者：Bond, Philip; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (notably Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Milgrom and Stokey 1982) by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. A leading example is the trade of a controlling stake in a corporation. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade exist. We discuss implications for when trade occurs, the correlation of actions with trade,...
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作者：Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：In every period, an aggressive country seeks concessions from a non-aggressive country with private information about their cost. The aggressive country can force concessions via war, and both countries suffer from limited commitment. We characterize the efficient sequential equilibria. We show that war is necessary to sustain peace and that temporary wars can emerge because of the coarseness of public information. In the long run, temporary wars can be sustained only if countries are patient,...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substi...
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作者：Keenan, Donald C.; Snow, Arthur
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Variation in the degree of downside risk aversion across decision makers has implications for efficient risk sharing. However, except for small differences in risk preferences, there is no index, analogous to the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, that depends only on local properties of the utility function and indicates the degree of aversion to downside risk. A measure that does depend only on local properties of the utility function u, the index of prudence p =u ''/u '', is related to dow...
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作者：Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I propose a simple model of merchants who are specialized in buying and selling a homogenous good. Facing the same frictions as in the buyer-seller direct trades, merchants can make profits with an ability to buy and sell many units of the good. They set the price to compete in the market and provide buyers with a strong likelihood of obtaining the good. This paper establishes a turnover equilibrium where some agents choose to become merchants endogenously. An interesting multiplicity can emer...
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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper elicits an additively separable representation of preferences in the Savage framework (where the objects of choice are acts: measurable functions from an infinite set of states to a potentially finite set of consequences). A preference relation over acts is represented by the integral over the subset of the product of the state space and the consequence space which corresponds to the act, where this integral is calculated with respect to a state-dependent utility measure on this spa...
