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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all ru...
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作者：Marinacci, Massimo; Montrucchio, Luigi
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Turin; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study unique and globally attracting solutions of a general nonlinear stochastic equation, widely used in Finance and Macroeconomics and closely related to stochastic Koopmans equations. The equation is specified by a temporal aggregator W and a certainty equivalent operator M. The main contribution of the paper is the introduction of the new class of Thompson aggregators. Other contributions of the paper are: (i) a detailed analysis of quasi-arithmetic operators M that generalize those of ...
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作者：Aruoba, S. Boragan; Chugh, Sanjay K.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We study optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an environment where explicit frictions give rise to valued money, making money essential in the sense that it expands the set of feasible trades. Our main results are in stark contrast to the prescriptions of earlier flexible-price Ramsey models. Two especially important findings emerge from our work: the Friedman Rule is typically not optimal and inflation is stable over time. Inflation is not a substitute instrument for a missing tax, as is som...
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作者：Mondria, Jordi
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices an...
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作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Saint-Paul, Gilles
作者单位：Laval University; Laval University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies the dynamics of fundamental research. We develop a simple model where researchers allocate their effort between improving existing fields and inventing new ones. A key assumption is that scientists derive utility from recognition from other scientists. We show that the economy can be either in a regime where new fields are constantly invented, and then converges to a steady state, or in a cyclical regime where periods of innovation alternate with periods of exploitation. We ...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents' preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity. Given this preference domain I analyze the interplay between properties of the network structure and (cooperative) solution concepts. The main structural condition is an acyclicity notion that rule...
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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Pompeu Fabra University; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; University of Vienna
摘要：A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, co...
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作者：Denuit, Michel M.; Eeckhoudt, Louis
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; IESEG School of Management; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper aims to extend the results by Ross (1981) [15] and by Modica and Scarsini (2005) [13] to stochastic dominance of degree 4 and over. Specifically, it is shown that Ross' approach can be extended to any order of risk attitude beyond the generalization proposed by Modica and Scarsini by means of sth degree increase in risk defined by Ekern (1980) [8]. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) [2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Baranchuk, Nina; Dybvig, Philip H.; Yang, Jun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：Disclosure by firms would seem to reduce investment inefficiency by reducing informational asymmetry. However, the impact of disclosure is endogenous and depends on incentives within the firm. Given optimal renegotiation-proof contracts, disclosing only accepted contracts does not solve the Myers-Majluf problem. What solves the problem is having either full transparency of all compensation negotiations or, more reasonably, additional forward-looking announcements. The model is robust to renego...
