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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements i...
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作者：Nascimento, Leandro; Riella, Gil
作者单位：New York University; Universidade de Brasilia
摘要：This paper characterizes models of ambiguous beliefs in the absence of the completeness axiom. We axiomatize multiple-selves versions of some of the most important examples of complete and ambiguity averse preferences, and characterize when those incomplete preferences are ambiguity averse. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Turku
摘要：We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium - satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property - does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset o...
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作者：Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper is a study of the information structures for these games, the discontinuous expected utility functions they give rise to, and the notion of a balanced approximation to an infinite game with discontinuou...
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作者：Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter's [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48-69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
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作者：Antoci, Angelo; Galeotti, Marcello; Russu, Paolo
作者单位：University of Sassari; University of Florence
摘要：In this paper we use global analysis techniques to analyze an economic growth model with environmental negative externalities, giving rise to a three-dimensional dynamic system (the framework is the one introduced by Wirl (1997) [53]). The dynamics of our model admits a locally attracting stationary state P-1*, which is, in fact, a poverty trap, coexisting with another stationary state P-2* possessing saddle-point stability. Global dynamical analysis shows that, under some conditions on the pa...
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作者：Chen, Ying
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic communication including sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism and message clustering. Surprisingly, the strategic receiver may respond to more aggressive claims with more moderate actions. In the limit as th...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Guerdjikova, Ani
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy fai...
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作者：Gerlagh, Reyer; Liski, Matti
作者单位：Aalto University; Tilburg University
摘要：We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch. Under such a threat of demand change, the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We characterize preferences over acts that can be represented by a utility function and a multiple-prior, such that an act f is preferred to act g if there is a prior under which the expected utility induced by f is higher than that induced by g. These preferences are referred to as justifiable preferences. We further introduce a generalized model of ambiguity that involves a collection of multiple-priors, namely, multiple multiple-priors and incorporate Bewley's Knightian model in justifiabil...
