Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Ying
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 401-424
• 关键词: communication; Honest senders; Naive receivers; Sender exaggeration; Receiver skepticism; Clustering of messages; Non-monotone receiver reaction; Finite message space; EXISTENCE

摘要

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic communication including sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism and message clustering. Surprisingly, the strategic receiver may respond to more aggressive claims with more moderate actions. In the limit as the probabilities of the non-strategic players approach zero, (i) the limit equilibrium corresponds to a most-informative equilibrium of the limit (Crawford-Sobel) game; (ii) only the top messages are sent. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.