Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.009
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 656-671
• 关键词: Infinite games; Continuous informational commonalities; Balanced approximations; PREVALENCE; Shyness

摘要

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper is a study of the information structures for these games, the discontinuous expected utility functions they give rise to, and the notion of a balanced approximation to an infinite game with discontinuous payoffs. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.