Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.006
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 638-655
• 关键词: Infinite games; Correlated equilibrium existence; Informational commonalities; Nonstandard analysis

摘要

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter's [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48-69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.