Institutions and growth in limited access societies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barseghyan, Levon; Guerdjikova, Ani
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 528-568
• 关键词: Class interests; endogenous growth; Entry barriers; Elite; GROWTH; institutions; Limited access; optimal institutions

摘要

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite's economic and political power. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.