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作者：Abraham, Arpad; Koehne, Sebastian; Pavoni, Nicola
作者单位：Stockholm University; European University Institute; Bocconi University
摘要：We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two-period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and borrow secretly. The first-order approach is valid if the following conditions hold: (i) the agent has non-increasing absolute risk aversion utility (NIARA), (ii) the output technology has monotone likelihood ratios (MLR), and (iii) the distribution function of output is log-convex in effort (LCDF). Moreover, under these three conditions, the o...
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作者：Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, Francois
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Guelph
摘要：We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5-7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We i...
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作者：Saran, Rene
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We extend the set of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences and characterize the domain in which the revelation principle holds. A weakening of the well-known contraction consistency is shown to define a subset of this domain. However, we show that minimax-regret preference can be outside the domain. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; F'olemarchakis, Herakles
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Reichlin, Pietro
作者单位：Roma Tre University; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We consider (possibly non-stationary) economies with endogenous solvency constraints under uncertainty over an infinite horizon, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) [5]. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass, 1972 [10]) completely characterizes constrained inefficiency under the hypothesis of uniform gains from risk-sharing (which is always satisfied in stationary economies when the autarchy is constrained inefficient). Uniform gains from risk-sharing also guarantee a finite value of the intertemporal a...
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作者：Chau, Nancy H.; Faere, Rolf
作者单位：Cornell University; Oregon State University
摘要：Appropriate assessment of the social value of market access is at the core of a broad range of inquiries in trade research. We propose a new approach based on a trade benefit function to obtain the shadow value of net imports. Our approach is in keeping with well-established trade welfare measurement techniques, for the trade benefit function is dual to the standard trade expenditure function. This dual relation further allows for a direct retrieval of the shadow values of net imports from the...
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作者：Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander; Temzelides, Ted
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Rice University
摘要：We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approxima...
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作者：Dai, Min; Jin, Hanqing; Liu, Hong
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); National University of Singapore; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We study the optimal trading strategy of mutual funds that face both position limits and differential illiquidity. We provide explicit characterization of the optimal trading strategy and conduct an extensive analytical and numerical analysis of the optimal trading strategy. We show that the optimal trading boundaries are increasing in both the lower and the upper position limits. We find that position limits can affect current trading strategy even when they are not currently binding and othe...
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作者：Mason, Robin; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：University of Exeter; Aalto University
摘要：We analyse optimal stopping when the economic environment changes because of learning. A primary application is optimal selling of an asset when demand is uncertain. The seller learns about the arrival rate of buyers. As time passes without a sale, the seller becomes more pessimistic about the arrival rate. When the arrival of buyers is not observed, the rate at which the seller revises her beliefs is affected by the price she sets. Learning leads to a higher posted price by the seller. When t...
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作者：Birulin, Oleksii; Izmalkov, Sergei
作者单位：New Economic School; University of Sydney
摘要：We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) [1] shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin's results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single-crossing condition-a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condi...
