On efficiency of the English auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Birulin, Oleksii; Izmalkov, Sergei
• 署名单位: New Economic School; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.009
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1398-1417
• 关键词: English auction; Efficient auction; Ex-post equilibrium; Single-crossing; interdependent values

摘要

We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) [1] shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin's results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single-crossing condition-a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition-and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.