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作者：Cao, H. Henry; Han, Bing; Hirshleifer, David
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Peking University
摘要：We offer a model in which sequences of individuals often converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads, despite communication of the payoff outcomes from past choices. This reflects both direct and indirect action-based information externalities. In contrast with previous cascades literature, cascades here are spontaneously dislodged and in general have a probability less than one of lasting forever. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to communicate can reduce average decision accura...
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作者：Eichberger, Juergen; Grant, Simon; Kelsey, David; Koshevoy, Gleb A.
作者单位：Rice University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Queensland; University of Exeter; Russian Academy of Sciences; Central Economics & Mathematics Institute RAS
摘要：In Ghirardato et al. (2004) [7], Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a subclass of alpha-MEU preferences. If attention is restricted to finite state spaces, we show that any alpha-MEU preference relation, satisfies GMM's axioms if and only if alpha = 0 or ...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of Dutta (1995) [5] and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) [9] To do this, the paper extends the concept of self-generation (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1990 [1]) to return generation, which explicitly tracks actions and incentives until the next time the state returns to its current value, and asks that p...
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作者：Brandt, Felix
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, encompassing the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, and the tournament equilibrium set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine...
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作者：Ellison, Martin; Pearlman, Joseph
作者单位：University of Oxford; London Metropolitan University
摘要：Saddlepath learning occurs when agents learn adaptively using a perceived law of motion that has the same form as the saddlepath relationship in rational expectations equilibrium. Under saddlepath learning, we obtain a completely general relationship between determinacy and e-stability, and generalise minimum state variable results previously derived only under full information. When the system is determinate, we show that a learning process based on the saddlepath is always e-stable. When the...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic in the context of social choice, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. We propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets of alternatives (set-rationalizability) and introduce two consistency conditions, (alpha) over bar and (gamma)over bar>, which are defined in analogy to Sen's alpha and gamma. We find that a choice functio...
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作者：Dziuda, Wioletta
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However, the decision maker is not influenced by the unfavorable arguments revealed by the biased expert. The...
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作者：Franke, Guenter; Schlesinger, Harris; Stapleton, Richard C.
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Manchester
摘要：We examine the effects of background risks on optimal portfolio choice. Examples of background risks include uncertain labor income, uncertainty about the terminal value of fixed assets such as housing and uncertainty about future tax liabilities. While some of these risks are additive and have been amply studied, others are multiplicative in nature and have received far less attention. The simultaneous effect of both additive and multiplicative risks has hitherto not received attention and ca...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, S.; Maccheroni, F.; Marinacci, M.; Montrucchio, L.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at the same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this representation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
