Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander; Temzelides, Ted
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.013
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1437-1463
• 关键词: Market games; Full Nash equilibrium; market power; COMPETITION; Experimental economics; evolutionary stability

摘要

We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy. Motivated by these findings, we provide a theoretical argument for why evolutionary forces can lead to competitive outcomes in market games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.