On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, Francois
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Guelph
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1464-1480
• 关键词: Efficient information aggregation; Scoring rules; Poisson games; Approval voting

摘要

We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5-7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.