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作者：Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Amsterdam
摘要：In a premium auction, the seller offers some payback, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders' risk preferences. We analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring. Upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that the premium causes the e...
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作者：Ferraris, Leo; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper studies economy-wide fluctuations that occur endogenously in the presence of monetary and real assets. Using a standard monetary search model, we consider an economy in which agents can increase consumption, over and above what their liquid monetary asset holdings would allow, pledging real assets as collateral for monetary loans. It is shown that, if the liquidation value of real assets is below full market value, a stable cyclical equilibrium can emerge in consumption and capital ...
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作者：Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement e-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of epsilon-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. Al...
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作者：Lopomo, Giuseppe; Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Duke University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper presents a principal-agent model in which the agent has imprecise beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent's preferences are incomplete as in Bewley (1986) [2]. In this setting, incentives must be robust to Knightian uncertainty. We study the implications of robustness for the form of the resulting optimal contracts. We give conditions under which there is a unique optimal contract, and show that it must have a simple flat payment plus bonus structure. That is...
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作者：Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper is a study of the information structures for these games, the discontinuous expected utility functions they give rise to, and the notion of a balanced approximation to an infinite game with discontinuou...
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作者：Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman
作者单位：Imperial College London
摘要：In markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services, sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre-sale consultation services. We study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre-sale information, next to the price of information and the product price, and obtain clear-cut predictions on when information is over- and when it is underprovided, even though we find that inf...
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; F'olemarchakis, Herakles
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Heifetz, Aviad
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Open University Israel
摘要：Consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information. What is the set of outcomes that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing? To address this question we define an epistemic model for the economy that provides a complete description not only of the beliefs of each agent on the relationship between states of nature and prices but also of the whole system of interactive beliefs. The main result, Theorem 1, provides a characterization of outcomes that are con...
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作者：Szech, Nora
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost c(n) of attracting is bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-m...
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作者：Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter's [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48-69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
