Optimal advertising of auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Szech, Nora
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2596-2607
• 关键词: Auctions; Advertising; order statistics

摘要

We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost c(n) of attracting is bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-maximizing seller, attract more bidders. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.