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作者：Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, Francois
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Guelph
摘要：We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5-7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We i...
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作者：Nascimento, Leandro; Riella, Gil
作者单位：New York University; Universidade de Brasilia
摘要：This paper characterizes models of ambiguous beliefs in the absence of the completeness axiom. We axiomatize multiple-selves versions of some of the most important examples of complete and ambiguity averse preferences, and characterize when those incomplete preferences are ambiguity averse. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sonmez (2006, 2008) [6,7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Li, Jingyuan
作者单位：Huazhong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We examine the demand for a risky asset in the presence of two risks: a financial risk and a background risk which need not be financial. First, we compute the necessary and sufficient condition for a positive demand for a risky asset, showing that it depends on two terms capturing respectively the direct effect of risk premium and the dependence between the two risks. Second, we develop higher order expectation dependence concept and show that the more information about the sign of higher cro...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Lazzati, Natalia
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept of industry viability, investigate its determinants, and show that it improves with more firms in the market and/or by technological progress. These results enlighten some well-known conclusions from case studies in the manage...
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作者：Stoye, Joerg
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper unifies and extends the recent axiomatic literature on minimax regret. It compares several models of minimax regret, shows how to characterize the according choice correspondences in a unified setting, extends one of them to choice from convex (through randomization) sets, and connects them by defining a behavioral notion of perceived ambiguity. Substantively, a main idea is to behaviorally identify ambiguity with failures of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Regarding proof ...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210-217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signa...
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作者：Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do not learn the correct forecasts too quickly, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on some data-generating processes; however, the set of such processes is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative r...
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作者：Gottardi, Piero; Kubler, Felix
作者单位：European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Zurich
摘要：In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is evaluated ex an...
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We consider a general equilibrium model where multi-member households make efficient collective consumption decisions and operate in a competitive market environment. Individuals have the option to leave the household and make it on their own or join another household. We study the effect of these outside options on household formation, household stability and equilibrium existence. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
