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作者：Pass, Brendan
作者单位：University of Alberta
摘要：We study the principal agent problem. We show that b-convexity of the space of products, a condition which appears in a recent paper by Figalli, Kim and McCann (2011) [9], is necessary to formulate the problem as a maximization over a convex set. We then show that when the dimension m of the space of types is larger than the dimension n of the space of products, this condition implies that the extra dimensions do not encode independent economic information. When m is smaller than n, we show th...
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作者：Oberfield, Ezra; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：A prominent feature of the Kiyotaki Wright model of commodity money is multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. We show that the extent of multiplicity hinges on the frequency of search. Holding fixed the average number of meetings over time, we vary search frequency by altering the interval between search opportunities. To isolate the role of search frequency, we focus on symmetric equilibria in a symmetric environment. For each frequency we characterize the entire set of payoffs, strategies, and ...
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作者：Raith, Michael
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study optimal incentive contracting in a two-period model in which an agent's action generates an output with delay, and a noisy signal of output early. Under very general conditions, the optimal contract depends on the early signal as well as on output even if the signal is uninformative of effort, given output, and even if the agent has access to credit. An important characteristic of any performance measure, therefore, is the time at which it is generated. The results shed light on the us...
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作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) [4]. For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent unable to perceive aspects of the world and distinguish states, modeled with subjective state spaces coarser than the objective state space. Fagin and Halpern limit the agent's language or cogni...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agents' beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust implementable in generic settings with quasi-linear utility, interdependent and bilinear values, and multi-dimensional payoff types. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Said, Maher
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient allocation using a sequence of ascending auctions. The buyers use memoryless strategies to reveal all private information in every period, inducing symmetric behavior across different cohorts. We extend our r...
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作者：Hugonnier, Julien
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：This article shows that portfolio constraints can give rise to rational asset pricing bubbles in equilibrium even if there are unconstrained agents in the economy who can benefit from the induced limited arbitrage opportunities. Furthermore, it is shown that bubbles can lead to both multiplicity and real indeterminacy of equilibria. The general results are illustrated by two explicitly solved examples where seemingly innocuous portfolio constraints make bubbles a necessary condition for the ex...
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking. The peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership. Equilibrium is asymmetric, with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per ra...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed epsilon > 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic two-person games where both players play according to the average testing procedure on blocks of k-periods. We demonstrate that for all k large enough, the pair of time-average payoffs converges (al...
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作者：Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in ...
