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作者：Evren, Oezguer
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large. The model has two key features that jointly drive the result: (i) some agents are altruistic (or ethical), (ii) among the agents who prefer any given candidate, the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain. When deciding whether to vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of ...
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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：I consider a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms. A mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments, as a function of ex-post realized demand. Buyers observe these advertisements and visit one seller without being able to coordinate their visiting strategies. Despite the oligopolistic nature of the model, all symmetric equilibria are constrained-efficient. In small markets, multiple equilibria exist that are...
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作者：Rubinstein, Ariel; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; New York University; Boston College
摘要：One problem caused by cycles of choice functions is indecisiveness decision makers will be paralyzed when they face choice sets with more than two options. We investigate the procedure of random sampling where the alternatives are random variables. When comparing any two alternatives, the decision maker samples each of the alternatives once and ranks them according to the comparison between the two realizations. We show that while this procedure may lead to violations of transitivity, the prob...
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作者：Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
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作者：Reis, Catarina
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：This paper considers a representative agent model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which the government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is more impatient than the households, the capital income tax will be positive in steady state. Thus, impatience and lack of commitment are able to generate positive capital taxes in the long run, although each of these characteristics individually was not. Furthermore, the steady s...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Essex
摘要：A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f -optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskin's definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin's monotonicity, is necessary for mixed...
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作者：Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：University of Erlangen Nuremberg; University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
摘要：We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our desig...
