Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Raith, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.010
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2158-2189
• 关键词: Optimal incentives; Performance measurement; Intertemporal consumption; Informativeness; Timeliness

摘要

I study optimal incentive contracting in a two-period model in which an agent's action generates an output with delay, and a noisy signal of output early. Under very general conditions, the optimal contract depends on the early signal as well as on output even if the signal is uninformative of effort, given output, and even if the agent has access to credit. An important characteristic of any performance measure, therefore, is the time at which it is generated. The results shed light on the use of forward-looking performance measures such as stock returns or earnings with accruals for accounts receivable. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.