Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2083-2123
• 关键词: Costly voting; Condorcet jury theorem; information aggregation

摘要

We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected-that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.